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Abstract 
 
We propose that people are genetic essentialists – that is, they tend to think of genetic 
attributions as being immutable, of a specific etiology, natural, and dividing people into 
homogenous and discrete groups. Although there are rare conditions where genes operate 
in these kinds of deterministic ways, people overgeneralize from these to the far more 
common conditions where genes are not at all deterministic. These essentialist biases are 
associated with some harmful outcomes such as racism, sexism, pessimism in the face of 
illnesses, political polarization, and support for eugenics, while at the same time they are 
linked with increased tolerance and sympathy for gay rights, mental illness, and less 
severe judgments of responsibility for crime. We will also discuss how these essentialist 
biases connect with the burgeoning direct-to-consumer genomics industry and various 
kinds of genetic engineering. Overall, these biases appear rather resistant to efforts to 
reduce them, although genetics literacy predicts weaker essentialist tendencies. 
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Essentially Biased: Why People Are Fatalistic About Genes 
 
By all accounts, the genomics revolution has arrived. Since the first human 
genome was sequenced in 2003, the cost of sequencing genomes has fallen by more than 
a million-fold, with the technical advancements of genotyping technologies far outpacing 
the rapid speed of improvements in computer transistors that was famously encapsulated 
in Moore’s law (National Human Genome Research Institute, 2016). As a result of these 
dramatic technical innovations, the new industry of direct-to-consumer (DTC) genomics 
companies has recently emerged, allowing individuals to have their genomes sequenced 
at a relatively affordable price. Customers can be provided with information that 
purportedly speaks to their likely genetic ancestry, their risks for developing various fatal 
diseases, and their children’s future career possibilities. Alongside this development, a 
vast scientific enterprise that links specific genetic variants to various human conditions 
continues to receive wide coverage in the popular media. How will people make sense of 
this brave new world of genomics? A growing field of psychological research has 
emerged to address this question.  
It may seem strange to ask how people will understand a new scientific 
revolution. Won’t they just come to learn this new information in the same way that they 
learn other information? That is, we might expect that people will respond more or less 
like scientists themselves do, whereby they slowly integrate their new insights with their 
existing ones, and ultimately developing a richer understanding that empowers them to 
more effectively interact with their world (cf., Kuhn, 1962/1996). On the other hand, 
much research has revealed that people don’t process information about genetic 
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attributions in a rational and even-handed way (for reviews, see Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 
2011; Heine, 2017). Rather, genetic causes are often understood fundamentally 
differently from other kinds of causes, and as we’ll elaborate below, this has significant 
implications for the ways that people make sense of their worlds. 
As a case in point, consider the following study (Dar-Nimrod, Cheung, Ruby, & 
Heine, 2014; Study 3): participants were randomly assigned to read one of three 
newspaper articles that discussed actual research related to obesity. Those who were 
assigned to a “Genetics” condition read about research describing how “obesity genes” 
relate to one’s weight. Another group was assigned to an “Experiences” condition and 
read about research describing how people’s social networks relate to their weight. A 
third group was assigned to a Control condition where they read an unrelated article 
about corn production. Following a series of food-related assignments to mask the 
purpose of the study, participants took part in a food tasting task; they were given some 
cookies to sample and evaluate their flavors. The key dependent variable was the amount 
of cookies that people ate. The results revealed that those in the “Genetics” condition 
consumed approximately one-third more cookies than those assigned to either the 
“Experiences” or the “Control” condition, who did not differ significantly from each 
other. The results of this study, together with those from several correlational studies in 
the same paper, suggest that people became more fatalistic about their weight when 
learning about genetic causes for obesity, but not when learning about experiential causes 
for obesity. This relative overweighing of genetic causes occurred even though both 
genes and experiences contribute to risk for obesity. Why might genetic causes be 
perceived differently than experiential ones? 
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1. Psychological Essentialism 
We can gain insight into how people consider genetic causes when we consider 
the broader question of how people make sense of why things in general are the way they 
are. Aristotle provided an answer to this metaphysical question by proposing that all 
entities are as they are because of an underlying essence that they possess which makes 
them so (Moravcsik, 2001). Essences were described by John Locke (1671/1959) as “the 
very being of anything, whereby it is what it is.” They are imagined to be deep, internal 
forces that form the basis of identity of entities, and cause the entities to function as they 
do. For example, essences are what gives rise to a cat’s agility, aloofness, hunting 
prowess, soft furry coat, curiosity, and penchant for catnip – without such an essence, 
cats would be very different creatures. Of course, trying to specify what precisely is the 
underlying essence of a cat, and how this essence leads to all those cat-like 
characteristics, is metaphysically intractable. But the question embraced by psychologists 
is not whether there actually are essences that undergird the reality which we live in, but 
whether people believe that these kinds of essences indeed make things so (Medin & 
Ortony, 1989). This belief that essences gives rise to entities is termed psychological 
essentialism. 
Evidence for psychological essentialism is widespread. Indeed, there are few 
psychological phenomena which have been identified in a broader array of samples than 
essentialism: studies have found support for essentialism in samples of Chaldean and 
Hmong immigrants in Detroit (Henrich & Henrich, 2007), Mongolian herders (Gil-
White, 2001), Vezo children in Madagascar (Astuti, 2001), Menominee in Wisconsin 
(Waxman, Medin, & Ross, 2007), rural Ukrainians (Kanovsky, 2007), children from poor 
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neighborhoods in Brazil (Sousa, Atran, & Medin, 2002), and several dozens of studies 
involving children and adults from Western countries (see Gelman, 2003, for a review). 
However, despite this universality in prevalence, there is evidence that some populations 
are more committed to essentialist thinking than others (e.g., Giles, Legare, & Samson, 
2008). For example, higher SES Americans hold more essentialist views than those of 
lower SES (Kraus, Piff, Mendoza-Denton, Rheinschmidt, & Keltner, 2012). Likewise, 
some psychological phenomena related to essentialism, such as a tendency to make 
dispositional attributions (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999) and to have more entity 
theories of self (Heine et al., 2001), are more prevalent among Western populations than 
among East Asians. This suggests that psychological essentialism could qualify as a 
functional universal, serving a similar function everywhere, although the degree of 
commitment varies across populations (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). Some have argued 
that it was adaptive for an omnivorous foraging species like humans to categorize the 
natural world around them into different species on the basis of imagined essences, to 
facilitate their success at foraging (e.g., Atran, 1998). 
Research has identified a number of characteristics associated with psychological 
essentialism, and as we will explain later, these influence how people think about genetic 
causes. First, essences are perceived to be immutable. The properties that they carry are 
seen to persist and remain somewhat inviolate to one’s experiences (for a review, see 
Gelman, 2003). They are perceived to lie deep within an individual, beyond the 
penetration of outside influences. For an example of this quality of essences, consider a 
study by Gil-White (2001) who interviewed Mongolian herdsman from two tribes: the 
Uryankhais, who are believed to be able to cast curses, and the Torguuds, who are not 
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thought to have any such curse-casting abilities. Gil-White posed a question to the 
herders: if a boy born to Uryankhai parents was raised by Torguuds, would he be able to 
cast curses? The interviewees responded that the boy would indeed have such capability, 
given his Uryankhai birth-parents, although he wouldn’t know it, given his Torguud 
upbringing. The boy’s Uryankhai essence is perceived to remain intact, and is not 
compromised despite his exclusively Torguud experiences. This sense that one’s 
upbringing does not impact one’s underlying essence is not likely the result of education, 
as it has been documented with young children across a variety of contexts (Giles, 2003; 
Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1997). For example, by the age of 5, children show evidence of a 
belief in the immutability of essences even in the face of large-scale transformations, 
such as a caterpillar developing in to a butterfly (Rosenbren, Gelman, Kalish, & 
McCormick, 1991). Entities may encounter a variety of experiences and transformations 
in their lives, but these are perceived to be inconsequential to the underlying essence 
(Gelman, 2004). 
Second, people think of essences as being deep down and internal, beyond the 
reach of external influences. We don’t actually see essences; they lie beneath the surface 
far beyond our visual field. Yet people believe that essences give rise to all that they see 
around them. Experiments where people are presented with natural kinds that have 
encountered some kinds of modifications to their surface reveal that people still believe 
that the underlying essence remains intact (e.g., Rips, 1989). By the age of 3, children 
view transformations of an object’s insides as impacting the object’s identity more than 
transformations to the object’s outsides, as the basis of identity lies with its deeply buried 
essence (Gelman & Wellman, 1991). However, despite lying outside of our ability to see 
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them, people believe that the essences are potentially accessible to experts (Gelman & 
Markman, 1987). 
Third, people think of essences as underlying the natural world; they play a much 
weaker role for our understanding of artifacts. So while people may perceive essences to 
differentiate between gold and fool’s gold, they are less likely to employ essences to 
define artifacts. The distinction between gold and fool’s gold is believed to be due to an 
underlying essence that is supposedly identifiable by experts; in contrast, the distinction 
between a station wagon and a sports utility vehicle is understood more to be a matter of 
convention (see also Gil-White, 2001; Malt, 1989). This distinction in the role of 
underlying essences between natural kinds (i.e., categories that exist in the natural world) 
and artifacts is also evident among children. For example, Keil (1989) presented 
kindergarten students with a thought experiment where a raccoon had been altered to 
look like a skunk, yet the children insisted that it remained a raccoon under its skunk 
dressing. On the other hand, the same children were quite willing to accept that a 
coffeepot had been transformed into a birdfeeder. Essences are defining elements for 
making sense of the perceived natural world, and are less consequential for understanding 
artifacts. 
A fourth feature of essences is that they are perceived to draw the boundaries of 
categories. They represent what members of a category share in common, and what 
differentiate them from members of different categories (Medin & Ortony, 1989). This is 
especially so in the way people turn to essences to understand different species (Atran, 
1998); for example, the basis of modern scientific taxonomy developed by Carl Linnaeus 
hinged on an assumption that different species derive from distinct essences (Ereshefsky, 
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2004). Likewise, this assumption also generalizes to people’s perceptions of ethnic 
groups (Gil-White, 2001; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992), and serves as one key foundation of 
prejudice (Alport, 1954). Essences seem to carve nature at its joints and as a result, 
people feel they can make inductive inferences about what a newly encountered 
individual may or may not be able to do based on the imagined essence of its group 
(Gelman, 2004).  
Finally, essences can be transferred from individual to individual while 
preserving their original identity. One way we can see this is that objects are perceived to 
be able to acquire the essences of their owners; a notion that is apparent from a young age 
(Gelman, Frazier, Noles, Manczak, & Stilwell, 2015). For example, Nemeroff and Rozin 
(1994) found that some American undergraduate students balked at the idea of wearing 
Hitler’s sweater, regardless of how much it has been dry-cleaned, for fear of coming in 
touch with his contaminating essence. In another example, approximately one-third of 
recipients of heart-transplants feel that they have acquired traits from their donors 
(Inspector, Kutz, & David, 2004). Likewise, prior to any education about heritability, 
young children understand that a child comes to acquire some aspects of essences from 
their biological parents even if they were adopted (Heyman & Gelman, 2000). Essences 
thus are understood to be able to move from object to object, and from parent to 
offspring. In sum, people’s intuitive understanding of essences comes wrapped up with 
some particular ideas about the ways that essences undergird the natural world. 
1.1 Genetic Essentialism 
Despite having rather specific ideas about what essences are like, people have a 
harder time forming concrete mental representations of essences. Hence, they turn to an 
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essence placeholder that serves as a scaffolding that affords explanations for how any 
observed characteristics have come to be (Medin & Ortony, 1989). People have turned to 
various essence placeholders throughout history for making sense of their worlds, such as 
the four humors of Hippocrates that were assumed to be critical for understanding health 
and personality, Chinese conceptions of chi, or the yogic belief in prana. But genes make 
a particularly apt placeholder for essences, and this leads people to imagine that genes 
share many of the features that they associate with essences (for more description, see 
Heine, 2017). 
Just as with essences, genes are perceived to be deep down and internal and thus 
share the same features as a non-materialistic placeholder, namely, not being constrained 
by any visible limitations in a manner that would bound future causal inferences (Medin 
& Ortony, 1989). Likewise, just as people believe that essences are potentially knowable 
to experts, people will often readily accept scientific claims of a novel genetic causal 
explanation for various phenomena (Dar-Nimrod & Godwin, 2016). Moreover, similar to 
how they perceive essences, people view genes as far-reaching causal factors – they offer 
reasons to explain a diverse array of phenomena, and provide a succinct account for why 
people behave in the ways they do (Jayaratne, Gelman, Feldbaum, Sheldon, Petty, & 
Kardia, 2009). In addition, as with essences, genes are understood to be transferred from 
one generation to another (Gil-White, 2001). And, just as with essences, genes are 
perceived to be stable and unchanging throughout a person’s lifetime, facilitating a sense 
of self-unity despite the overwhelming physical and psychological transformations that 
occur across their development (Chandler & Proulx, 2008). Genes are therefore 
remarkably well-suited to serve as essence placeholders, given that people’s 
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understanding of genes aligns well with how people conceive of essences. Because of this 
overlap with people’s essentialist intuitions, we submit that when most people are 
thinking about genes they are not really thinking about genes – they are thinking about 
metaphysical essences. 
Conceiving of genes as essence placeholders suggests that people’s understanding 
of genetics may be somewhat distorted. In line with this, a body of research documents 
an enduring, limited public understanding of basic genetic science (Condit, 2010; 
Henderson & Maguire, 2000). For example, a survey of American adults (Lanie et al., 
2004) found that fewer than half could correctly answer the question, “Where in your 
body are your genes located?” (the correct answer is in your cells). Likewise, based on a 
U.S. nationally representative survey of American adults, Christensen, Jayaratne, 
Roberts, Kardia, and Petty (2010) found that 76% incorrectly believed that “single genes 
directly control specific human behaviors.” Moreover, with regard to evaluating U.S. 
high school students’ knowledge of genetics, the National Assessment of Education 
Progress (NAEP) revealed substantial deficiencies in genetic proficiency (O'Sullivan et 
al., 2003), most commonly observed in students’ interpretation of genetic materials and 
understanding of genetic diseases. The NAEP included 8 questions probing students’ 
understanding of genetics and genetic engineering (e.g., what is a gene? what is it made 
out of?). It also provided an article discussing the use of viruses in genetic engineering 
and asked the examinees to utilize their own knowledge along with the materials in the 
article, in answering relevant questions. Only 1% of twelfth graders provided accurate 
responses that reflected appropriate integration of their knowledge and the genetic essays 
they read, demonstrating broad misconceptions among soon-to-be high school graduates. 
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Even among arguably the most informed students, those who voluntarily submitted an 
essay to the American Society of Human Genetics' National DNA Day Essay Contest, 
more than half demonstrated a common misunderstanding of basic genetic concepts and 
essentialist biases (Shaw, Van Horne, Zhang, & Boughman, 2008). 
These various misconceptions about genes may be facilitated by the pervasive 
representations of characteristics and conditions as genetically derived which appear 
across various socialization agents (families, media, the arts, or schools). Frequently, 
simple OGOD (one gene, one disease; Conrad, 2002) accounts are offered in making 
sense of complex phenomena, facilitating the assumption that there is a single 
corresponding genetic cause underlying every human trait. Whether one reads a 
newspaper article entitled “’Fat’ gene found by scientists” (Henderson, 2007), watches a 
Hollywood blockbuster in which genes are presented deterministically (e.g., Gattaca, The 
Hulk, X-Men), or is told that the “gene for alcoholism runs in my family,” these 
commonplace exposures contribute to the implicit endorsement of genes as the essence of 
personhood. These simplified representations are straightforward, simple to digest, and 
are commonly tainted by an erroneous fatalistic flair (Conrad, 1999; Dar-Nimrod & 
Heine, 2011). A genetics curriculum focusing on Mendelian models that highlight 
deterministic inheritance only exacerbates such reductionist notions (Dar-Nimrod, 2012; 
Dougherty, 2009; Radick, 2016).   
Regardless of how people come to acquire their understanding of genetics, it is 
common for them to perceive genes in a simplified and almost mystical, agentic fashion 
(e.g., Nelkin & Lindee, 1995; Sheldon et al., 2007), ignorant of the complex, interactive 
processes that invariably occur between genes and environmental factors (for thoughtful 
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discussions see Pinker, 2003; Ridley, 2003; Turkheimer, 2000). Despite harboring 
misconceptions about genes and their operations (e.g., Christensen et al., 2010; Lanie et 
al., 2004), people readily invoke genes to explicate a broad range of human afflictions, 
capabilities, and behaviors (e.g., Condit et al., 2004; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; 
Jayaratne et al. 2006; Sheldon, Pfeffer, Jayaratne, Feldbaum, & Petty, 2007). As people’s 
understanding of genetics is extremely limited, it seems that genes are often invoked as 
the embodiment of a metaphysical essence rather than as components of a biological 
process for building proteins (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011).  
This is not to say that essentialist explanations are the sole kind of causal 
explanations that people consider (e.g., people readily accept that smoking is causally 
related to lung cancer), nor that all essentialist explanations rest on a foundation of genes 
(for other exemplars, see Gil-White, 2001; Haslam, 2011; Rangel & Keller, 2011). 
Rather, given the substantial conceptual overlap between people’s lay understanding of 
both genes and natural kinds’ metaphysical essences, genetic attributions often activate or 
strengthen certain essentialism-derived cognitive biases. 
The Genetic Essentialism Framework (GEF: Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011) offers a 
theoretical foundation for describing cognitive processes set in motion once a person 
perceives genes to be a relevant causal factor. The GEF suggests that genetic attributions 
for various traits, conditions, or diseases activate four specific psychological processes 
termed genetic essentialist biases. 
The first bias, immutability/determinism, specifies that thinking about genetic 
attributions leads people to view relevant outcomes as less changeable and more 
predetermined (see Gould & Heine, 2012). To the extent that a phenomenon is perceived 
Genetic Essentialism 
	
15 
to be immutable, it will be perceived to be beyond someone’s control; and indeed, genetic 
attributions decrease perceptions of control over relevant outcomes (e.g., Parrott & 
Smith, 2014) and limit the perceived capability of other means, such as environmental 
manipulations or individuals’ volition, to modify the outcome (e.g., Jayaratne et al., 
2009). For example, research indicates that endorsement of genetic etiological 
explanations for disease is negatively associated with perception of control over a disease 
(e.g., Dar-Nimrod, Zuckerman, & Duberstein, 2013; Jayaratne, Giordimaina, Gaviglio, 
2012; Shiloh, Rashuk-Rosenthal, & Benyamini, 2002). Discounting one’s personal 
control also leads to a reduction in perceived capability to execute a desirable behavior, 
which may lead to decreased domain-specific self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977). In line with 
that assertion, a study of inactive university students found that exercise-related self-
efficacy is lower after exposure to a genetic attribution for inactivity compared with an 
experiential attribution (Beauchamp et al., 2011). 
Perception of immutability is not the only relevant cognition that affects 
perceived behavioral control when genetic etiology is implicated. The second genetic 
essentialist bias, the tendency to discount additional causal explanations once genetic 
attributions are made (termed single or specific etiology), also increases the likelihood 
that people will disregard alternative casual attributions for complex phenomenon (Dar-
Nimrod & Heine, 2011). In accordance with this bias, identifying a particular gene can 
become conflated with a diagnosis of the related condition. Genes seem to be especially 
suited for narrowing the search for causes, because when genes are implicated as 
potential etiological explanations, they are viewed as more specific than experiential 
explanations to the outcome (Dar-Nimrod, Cheung, et al., 2014, Study 2). For example, 
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someone who learns that she does not have “the gene for breast cancer,” might then view 
herself as not needing to engage in any future screening efforts, which would be a grossly 
incorrect conclusion from the genetic testing results. In line with this bias, research 
indicates that whereas environmental causal attributions are positively correlated with a 
sense of personal choice, greater endorsement of genetic attributions are negatively 
associated with both environmental attributions and a sense of choice (Jayaratne et al., 
2009).  
Whereas the first two genetic essentialist biases focus on individuals, the third one 
extends the attention to groups. The metaphysical essence is at its core a category-
enabling construct; that is, it is the identifying facet that determines membership in a 
specific natural group (e.g., being a cat). It follows that essentialist thinking leads a 
person to focus on the central identifying features that are common to all the members, 
drawing attention away from in-group differentiating features. A focus on the 
commonalities should lead to viewing individual members of a category as more 
homogeneous because they share the identifying features (e.g., “catness”); as such, 
essentialist thinking also brings to the fore the distinctiveness of members of a category 
from those who are not in it and do not share these defining features (e.g., a whale). 
Hence, genes, like essences, can be seen to carve nature at its joints. The same principle 
seems to operate with social categories, such as race or gender (Haslam, Rothschild, & 
Ernst, 2000; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). And indeed, this third genetic essentialist bias, 
homogeneity /discreteness, asserts that genetic explanations for (social/natural) group 
differences increase the likelihood that each group will be viewed as homogeneous and 
more discrete from each other. Consistent with this bias, a large public opinion survey 
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indicated that conservatives, who are more likely to see racial groups as homogenous and 
distinct from each other than liberals (e.g., Gillborn, 1997), are also more likely to view 
racial differences as caused by genetic dissimilarities (Suhay & Jayaratne, 2012). 
Utilizing an experimental approach, Brescoll and LaFrance (2004) found that 
highlighting biological/genetic differences between men and women increased adoption 
of stereotypical descriptors.   
The final genetic essentialist bias is naturalness, that is, genetic attributions 
increase the likelihood that a relevant outcome is perceived as a natural outcome. There is 
long-standing evidence in psychology that viewing an outcome as natural has an 
important evaluative component attached to it. Research on the naturalistic fallacy (e.g., 
Frankena, 1939; Moore, 1903; see also the related longevity bias: Eidelman & Crandall, 
2014) has consistently demonstrated that elements which are perceived as natural are also 
perceived as inherently good and desirable. Whether it is the romantic notion behind 
Rousseau’s uncorrupted noble savage, the large “all natural ingredients” labels on goods 
at the supermarket, or political ideologies harnessing the term “natural order” to 
perpetuate their control, the evidence for such a tendency is all around us. By offering 
genes as causal explanation, the outcome is implicitly viewed to be natural and, by 
extension, appropriate. And indeed, men show increased moral acceptance of undesirable 
behaviors such as date-rape when genes are even remotely implicated as opposed to 
societal forces (Dar-Nimrod, Heine, Cheung, & Schaller, 2011, Study 2). Furthermore, 
consistent with the naturalness bias, despite the consensual scientific position that 
genetically-modified organisms are safe to eat, a majority of consumers wish to avoid 
them, often justifying their opposition by concluding that these products are “against 
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nature” (Blancke, Van Breusegem, De Jaeger, Braeckman, & Van Montagu, 2015, p. 
415). In that sense, genetic attributions may be used to increase acceptance of specific 
outcomes by appealing to our tendency to conflate what naturally “is” with what “ought 
to be,” although, as we shall see in later sections, attempts to strategically use this bias do 
not produce straightforward outcomes.  
Recently, a new measure, the Genetic Essentialist Tendencies Scale (GETS; Dar-
Nimrod, 2014), was constructed to assess these four biases. With six items addressing 
each of the biases, the 24-item measure targets the different facets of genetic essentialism 
(e.g., Immutability: “People with a genetic predisposition to a certain personality are 
destined to behave in a certain way”; Specific Etiology: “The environment does not affect 
the chances of getting cancer for someone with a genetic susceptibility to cancer”; 
Homogeneity: “People with a gene associated with risk taking are probably quite 
similar”; Naturalness: “It is natural to behave aggressively if one has genetic 
predisposition to aggression”). Data collected from community samples in several studies 
confirm the fit of a 4-factor underlying structure of the measure. They also uncover 
moderate to strong positive correlations (.30 < r < .60) between the different biases and a 
factorial structure that supports the notion that genetic essentialism can be conceptualized 
as a unitary, second-order construct comprised from these separate biases (Dar-Nimrod, 
Ruby, Godwin, Cheung, Murray, & Tam, 2016). These studies revealed that the biases, as 
measured by the GETS, predicted varied outcomes such as fatalism, negative views of 
human nature (i.e., social cynicism), various forms of prejudice, health pessimism (both 
in general and when genes are implicated for a specific disease), and reduced intentions 
to engage in healthy behaviors, among others (Dar-Nimrod et al., 2016). 
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1.2 Are These Biases Irrational? 
 We describe the aforementioned intuitions about genetic essentialism as biases. 
But what if instead these intuitions are a good enough approximation of the ways that 
genes actually influence our phenotypes? On what grounds can we call them biases as 
opposed to accurate descriptions of the nature of genetic causes? 
 Indeed, it is not difficult to come up with examples of genetic causes which map 
nicely on to the intuitions that we describe above. For example, going right back to the 
origins of genetics research, we can consider the observations of Gregor Mendel’s 
original studies with pea plants that were conducted in the gardens of St. Thomas’s 
Abbey in the present day Czech Republic. Mendel found 7 characters of peas that were 
passed faithfully from parent to offspring, and ultimately provided the scientific world 
with the key notions of genetic segregation and dominance (Henig, 2000). For example, a 
pea that inherited two copies of a particular allele from its parents would produce a pea 
with yellow pods – one hundred percent of the time. The causal forces that produce a 
yellow pod do indeed to appear to be immutable (there’s no indication that this causal 
series could be interrupted to produce a green pod instead); it has a specific etiology (the 
distinction between whether the pod is yellow or green is determined solely by the 
particular alleles that the plant inherits from its parents); all yellow podded pea plants of 
this species are homogenous to the extent that they all share the same alleles, and are 
discrete in that they are genetically different from their green-podded neighbors; finally, 
the yellowness of the pod would appear to be natural – emerging as it does from its 
default state, and is not the product of any kind of artificial engineering. So aren’t the 
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intuitions identified in the GEF just another means for describing the way that genes 
produce traits in pea plants? 
 We agree that these intuitions are a good-enough description of the causal forces 
at work in Mendel’s pea plants. However, these pea plants are not at all representative of 
the ways that genes influence phenotypes more generally. Turkheimer (1998) highlights a 
continuum that lies between two broad classes of genotype-phenotype relations. On the 
one extreme of the continuum is what he calls strong genetic explanation. Strong genetic 
explanation means that a particular biological process has been identified and localized 
which can explain a large part of the phenotype under question. The link between the 
dominant allele and yellow pod color is a clear case of strong genetic explanation, as are 
the variations of the CFTR gene which have been found to deterministically cause cystic 
fibrosis (Pearson, 2009). For traits that can be characterized as having a strong genetic 
explanation, the aforementioned genetic-essentialist intuitions are reasonably accurate 
descriptions. 
 However, this direct one-to-one relation between a particular genetic variant and a 
particular phenotypic character are not at all common. For example, the direct-to-
consumer (DTC) genomics company, 23andMe, provides information on 60 human traits, 
ranging from eye color to likelihood of going bald. Only one of these traits – whether or 
not you have wet or dry earwax – is a Mendelian trait that emerges in this direct one-to-
one way (Heine, 2017). Indeed, when students learn about genetics in high school, they 
may well encounter examples that are described as Mendelian characteristics, such as eye 
color, or whether or not you can roll your tongue into a tube. Neither of these are 
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Mendelian traits, and the fact that high school curricula rely so much on these inaccurate 
examples reflects just how rare easily observed monogenic traits actually are.  
Rather, human traits are more typically characterized by what Chabris et al. 
(2015) refer to as “the fourth law of behavioral genetics”, which states that “a typical 
human behavioral trait is associated with very many genetic variants, each of which 
accounts for a very small percentage of the behavioral variability” (p. 305). For example, 
researchers have identified more than 100 common genetic variants that predict 
schizophrenia, which account for only a fraction of the genetic variability in the condition 
(Schizophrenic Working Group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium, 2014). 
Likewise, although height is highly heritable, researchers estimate that you would need to 
consider approximately 294,000 common genetic variants to account for half of the 
variability in human height (Yang et al., 2010). Similarly, despite the relatively strong 
heritability of IQ, there are no single genes that predict IQ to any appreciable degree (the 
strongest single predictor is associated with about 0.3 IQ points; Reitveld et al., 2014); 
instead, approximately 500,000 variants are estimated to be implicated in predicting one 
half of IQ variability (Davies et al., 2011). These examples all represent what Turkheimer 
(1998) calls weak genetic explanation. In these cases the phenotype (e.g., whether or not 
one develops schizophrenia) is associated with a genotype (e.g., risk of schizophrenia is 
heritable), but not in a direct or deterministic way. Many genes interact, perhaps 
thousands of them, and each contributes to the likelihood of the phenotype. Phenotypes 
are influenced by genes only when the genes express proteins, and this expression is 
dependent on experiences in the environment. Moreover, this expression varies across the 
organism’s developmental trajectory. Further complicating matters, various epigenetic 
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markers can influence when and how often particular proteins are expressed (for a 
review, see Cole, 2009). Although genotypes correlate with phenotypes, in cases of weak 
genetic explanation the correlation remains largely unexplained, and the vast complexity 
of the interaction of the multiple forces at work may even be in principle unknowable, at 
least with the current limits of our technologies. Thus, explaining these complex 
phenomena by referring to the unspecified involvement of genes remains the wrong level 
of analysis to understand them (see Turkheimer, 1998, for discussion). 
The error that people commonly make, and what leads us to call people’s genetic 
essentialist intuitions “biases”, is that people overgeneralize from the straightforward, 
easy to understand, yet rare examples of strong genetic explanation to explaining the vast 
majority of other phenotypes which emerge from weak genetic explanation. It is incorrect 
to assume that traits that are a product of weak genetic influence can be understood better 
by thinking of them as immutable, natural, of a specific etiology, and forming 
homogenous and discrete groups.  
1.3 Genetic Essentialism is Widespread and Distorts People’s Understanding 
 Our central thesis is as follows: when people consider that genes are involved in a 
trait, they come to think differently about that trait. They come to conceive of it as though 
it was caused by an essence, and they consider the trait in ways that are consistent with 
their essentialist biases. For example, consider how people’s genetic essentialist biases 
can manifest in the way they think of learning styles. Many people endorse the idea of 
learning styles, or the belief that different people rely on distinct styles for most 
efficiently learning new material (e.g., visual learners vs. auditory learners; Dunn, 
Griggs, Olson, Beasley, & Gorman, 1995; Joy & Kolb, 2009). An extension of this idea 
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is the meshing hypothesis, which suggests that optimal learning occurs when an 
educator’s teaching style matches with a student’s learning style. Despite the lack of 
robust empirical evidence for such concepts (see Pashler, McDaniel, Rohrer, & Bjork, 
2008), many people still endorse them, which can be predicted based on the extent to 
which people essentialize genes.  
For example, American MTurk participants were asked to report the extent to 
which they thought learning styles were genetic versus environmental in origin, along 
with various perceptions of learning styles. The more the participants perceived learning 
styles to be genetically caused, the less control they expected one to have over what 
learning styles one has, the less malleable they thought learning styles were, and the more 
they thought that learning outcomes are best when learning styles and teaching styles 
match (i.e., endorsement of the meshing hypothesis). Crucially, mediation analyses 
revealed that both perceived control and perceived malleability of learning styles 
significantly mediated the relation between perceived etiology of learning styles and 
people’s endorsement of the meshing hypothesis (Cheung, White, Sumitani, Truong, & 
Heine, 2016). Overall, this study provides a simple illustration of the role that genetic 
essentialist biases may play in our lives. 
 The notion that our essentialist biases influence our thinking when people 
encounter genetic explanations is not something that we should expect to be limited to a 
small set of rare or inconsequential traits, because evidence for heritability is extremely 
broad (e.g., Olson, Vernon, Harris, & Jang, 2001). Heritability refers to the proportion of 
a trait’s variability within a specific sample that is due to genetics, and it is typically 
summarized by a heritability coefficient which varies from zero to one. Notably, 
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heritability does not indicate the extent to which a trait is caused by genes in some direct 
way. Evidence for heritability (i.e., a heritability coefficient that is significantly greater 
than zero) has been demonstrated for such diverse traits and behaviors as whether one 
disapproves of student pranks (Martin, Eaves, Heath, Jardine, Feingold, & Eysenck, 
1986), watches a lot of television (Plomin, Corley, DeFries, & Fulker, 1990), donates 
blood (Pedersen et al., 2015), gets divorced (McGue & Lykken, 1992), or even gets 
mugged (Kendler & Karkowski-Shuman, 1997). In fact, evidence for heritability is so 
broad that Turkheimer (2000) proposed the “first law of behavioral genetics” which states 
that “all human behavioral traits are heritable” (p. 160). This law is meant to be the null 
hypothesis, rather than a fixed law, in the sense that heritability evidence is so extensive 
that we should assume human characteristics are heritable until proven otherwise. An 
example of an exception to this is that although one’s degree of religiosity is heritable 
(Bouchard, 2004), the particular religion that one belongs to (e.g., Buddhism, Islam, 
Catholicism) is not (D’Onofrio, Eaves, Murrelle, Maes, & Spilka, 1999). Of course, if 
almost everything is heritable, and to a fairly similar degree, then the utility of the very 
concept of heritability comes into question (Turkheimer, 2000). Nonetheless, given that 
so much of human behavior is heritable, and that – according to the fourth law of 
behavioral genetics – this heritability is usually the product of weak genetic influence 
(Chabris et al., 2015), our genetic essentialist biases can potentially distort how we 
understand much of the human condition.  
Our essentialist biases are also at risk for interacting with a new kind of genetic 
information that is becoming more common. In recent years, dozens of DTC companies 
have emerged that provide risk information for more than 100 common diseases that are 
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products of weak genetic explanation, such as most cancers, coronary heart disease, or 
Type II diabetes (Kaufman, Bollinger, Dvoskin, & Scott, 2012). The essentialist bias that 
people tend to understand genetic causes as emerging from a single etiology is 
particularly worrisome in the face of this DTC disease-risk information. After reviewing 
their genotyping results, a customer might conclude, for example, that they have “the 
Type II Diabetes gene,” or “the Parkinson’s gene.” With a tendency to see genetic causes 
as ultimate causes, people may well find this kind of genetic information to be far more 
worrisome than the risk estimates actually communicate. Indeed, such faulty 
interpretations of genotyping results are not rare (e.g., Gordon, Griffin, Wawak, Pang, 
Gollust, & Bernhardt, 2012; Wang, Gonzalez, & Merajver, 2004), and genetic counselors 
struggle to communicate genetic risk in a way that people can understand it (Austin, 
2010; Evans, Blair, Greenhalgh, Hopwood, & Howell, 1994; Smerecnik, Mesters, 
Verweij, de Vries, & de Vries, 2009). An individual’s genotyping results may be viewed 
through the same set of essentialist biases that distorts the way people understand genetic 
causes more generally. 
2. The Impact of Genetic Attributions on People’s Perceptions 
The notion that people have genetic essentialist biases presupposes that genetic 
arguments have undue influence on people’s perceptions. As we discussed earlier, 
participants responded quite differently to an article arguing for a genetic cause of obesity 
compared with an article arguing for an experiential cause – it was only the genetic 
article that impacted people’s eating behavior relative to a control group. This biased 
reaction to genetic information is not limited to perceptions of obesity – as we’ll show, 
genetic attributions affect people’s perceptions across a broad array of different domains. 
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Curiously, the domains which have shown biased responses to genetic information cut 
across topics that tend to be quite politically contentious. Frequently, essentialist thinking 
is bound up with intolerance, such as racism and sexism. Yet on other topics, essentialist 
thinking is seemingly paired with increased tolerance, as in the case of gay rights and 
criminal responsibility. In the following section, we’ll consider the evidence for how 
genetic attributions affect people’s perspectives on a variety of topics. 
2.1 Sex and Gender 
 “It’s a girl!” These three words often signal a delightful end of the strenuous 
efforts to bring a new person into the world. The beaming, exhausted parents are now 
armed with an answer to the first question they are likely to encounter upon delivering 
the great news about the expanding family. Although the appropriate call should have 
been “it’s a female” denoting the sex of the newborn, given that sex, rather than gender, 
denotes the biological differences captured by the visible indicators and their underlying 
chromosomes, research may reveal that the reason for this ongoing error may be our 
tendency to see gender as the most essentialized social category (e.g., Haslam et al., 
2000); that is, gender is viewed as denoting group differences that are the most natural, 
discrete, and immutable of all social categories (in contrast to categories such as race, 
ethnicity, sexual orientation, SES) and therefore may be easily swapped with the term 
sex.   
 However, gender, the term that captures normative perspectives of femininity and 
masculinity, is highly culture-specific. The host of roles, responsibilities, and behavior 
that capture appropriate ways to be a man or woman substantially differs from one place 
to another. For example, whereas the majority of people in gender-egalitarian countries 
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view career importance and sexual freedom of men and women as equal, the majority of 
men and women in gender-stratified cultures do not (e.g., Williams & Best, 1990). Such 
malleability of gender perceptions has led some to completely reject biological 
explanations for gender differences beyond genitalia (e.g., Fausto-Sterling, 1985); 
however, a complete rejection of the role of nature in forming gender-typical preferences 
and behavior has proven to be inadequate when empirically applied to the real world. For 
example, instances of involuntary sex-reassignment procedures that have been conducted 
on infants in error (e.g., circumcision complications) have consistently demonstrated that 
while genitalia can be easily altered, gender-development is most likely to follow natal-
sex rather than the reassigned one (e.g., Diamond & Sigmundson, 1997; Reiner & 
Gearhart, 2004). 
 Natal sex, however, is not a deterministic predictor of a person’s gender either. 
Discarding both the chromosomal indicator and socialization pressures, transgender 
individuals, some not much older than toddlers, adopt alternative gender identities. The 
willingness of such individuals to incur substantial social costs (e.g., Norton & Herek, 
2013; Stotzer, 2009) in the process indicates just how psychologically painful it can be to 
be assigned a gender identity at odds with how one identifies oneself. As Stotzer (2009) 
asserted, transgender people’s very existence is repelled by “a society that is unforgiving 
of any system of gender that is not binary” (p. 170). Such a reaction is not surprising 
when one considers that their presence pulls the rug from underneath this most 
essentialized category.  
 Perceiving clear boundaries between men and women – boundaries that 
transgender people’s existence violates – allows for clearer assignments of gender-roles, 
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a priori suppositions about skills and limitations, and other forms of stereotypical 
thinking. As such, the GEF predicts that the tendency to view ingroup members as more 
homogeneous, on the one hand, and increasingly distinct from outgroup members, on the 
other, should be exacerbated when genetic attributions are involved; thus, one would 
expect that endorsing genetic attributions for gender differences is associated with 
indicators of stereotyping and prejudice. And indeed, the more a person believes that 
genes determine a host of behavioral and psychological phenomena, the higher they score 
on an inventory of sexism (Keller, 2005). Moreover, increased endorsement of biological 
over socialization explanations for gender is associated with greater self-identification 
with stereotypically-gendered traits (Coleman & Hong, 2008), in line with increased 
perceptions of the homogeneity of one’s own group. 
 The correlational nature of the above research limits causal inferences, because 
such findings may be interpreted as indicative of dispositional elements that give rise to 
both preferences for genetic explanations and endorsement of stereotypes (e.g., 
conservatism). Thus, experimental designs are needed to explore whether exposure to 
genetic attributions affects gender-related attitudes and behaviors. Utilizing this kind of 
experimental approach, Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2006) examined the effects of offering 
genetic causal explanations for alleged sex differences in math aptitude on women’s math 
performance. In two studies, women were provided with either genetic or experiential 
explanations for a purported superiority in math performance among men; other women 
were led to believe that there are no such gender differences. Results indicated that 
women who were exposed to a genetic explanation for the purported gender disparity 
performed worse compared to those in the experimental or no difference conditions. 
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Women who were given an experiential explanation for the alleged sex difference, on the 
other hand, did not show diminished performance, performing on par with the women 
who learned that men and women do not differ in math performance (for similar findings 
on a different trait, see Moè & Pazzaglia, 2010).  
2.2 Sexual orientation 
Gender may be the most essentialized social category, but it is far from being the 
only one. With a prominent (Western) societal shift from pathologizing and criminalizing 
same-sex attraction towards its reception as an acceptable form of sexual desire, recent 
decades have seen monumental changes in judgment of non-heterosexual preferences and 
behavior. That said, painful reminders of rejection of non-heterosexual preferences are 
still around us. Whether such rejection comes in a form of ongoing criminalization of 
homosexual behavior as is the case in dozens of countries around the world, or through 
hateful rhetoric as in the case of the Westboro Baptist Church, or outright violence and 
carnage as in the murderous rampage at an Orlando gay nightclub in 2016, the 
prominence of sexual orientation as an essence-bearing marker remains. As part of this 
prominence, much of the discussion (and some suggest the increased acceptance of same-
sex attraction) revolves around the perceived origin of one’s sexual orientation; whereas 
some endorse the idea that sexual orientation is the product of personal choice or 
upbringing, others favor genetic explanations (e.g., Jayaratne et al., 2006).  
Passionate scientific and popular debates rage around the causal question of 
sexual orientation. Whereas sex is chromosomally-indicated, research has not discovered 
any genes that predict sexual orientation to a meaningful degree. The closest scientists 
have come to discovering such evidence came about in the early 1990’s. Variations in a 
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specific genetic marker (encompassing multiple genes) on the subtelomeric region of the 
long arm of the sex chromosome, Xq28, were implicated in influencing at least one 
subtype of male homosexuality (Hamer, Hu, Magnuson, Hu, & Pattatucci, 1993); 
however, independent replication efforts have provided conflicting results (Ramagopalan, 
Dyment, Handunnetthi, Rice, & Ebers, 2010; Rice, Anderson, Risch, & Ebers, 1999; 
Sanders et al., 2014). Moreover, when it comes to identifying specific genetic 
underpinning for female homosexuality, there is, as of yet, no reputable relevant 
evidence. Despite the inability of molecular biology to identify a specific gene as a 
conclusive indicator of sexual orientation, the term “gay gene” has been featured 
prominently in media coverage, as indicated, for example, by the hundreds of thousands 
of search results following a simple Google search. Molecular biology aside, a key 
controversy underlies debates on the causal determinants of sexual orientation: is sexual 
attraction inborn or does it arise from socialization experiences and/or personal choice? 
Although a full account of the scientific research and discourse about this question is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, there is much evidence for a significant heritable 
component for sexual orientation (e.g., Bailey & Bell, 1993; Bailey, Dunne, & Martin, 
2000).  
Regardless of the evidence for the role of genes in sexual orientation, this chapter 
is concerned with people’s etiological perceptions and their outcomes. One desirable 
feature of believing that genes underlie sexual orientation is that this belief is associated 
with more accepting attitudes toward LGB individuals than is the belief that it is socially 
determined or chosen (e.g., Haslam & Levy, 2007; Jayaratne et al., 2006). This seems to 
suggest that adopting genetic explanations for sexual orientation decreases negative 
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attitudes toward LGB individuals. Indeed, some experimental research also supports a 
causal interpretation of these correlations, indicating that manipulating perceived etiology 
by emphasizing genetic explanations results in increased support for LGB causes (e.g., 
Falomir Pichastor & Mugny, 2009, Study 5; Frias-Navarro, Monterde-i-Bort, Pascual-
Soler, & Badenes-Ribera, 2015). However, some key moderators for the effect of genetic 
attributions on LGB support have also been identified, such as college major (Oldham & 
Kasser, 1999), pre-manipulation attitudes (Boysen & Vogel, 2007), or the nature of one’s 
opposition to equal rights (Frias-Navarro et al., 2015), suggesting that manipulation of 
etiological attributions does not necessarily lead to increased tolerance. Taken together, 
growing data indicate that the association between positive attitudes towards LGB 
individuals/causes and endorsement of genetic attributions for sexual orientation may, at 
least for some, be an outcome of motivated cognition; that is, ideology may play a 
substantial role in explaining these data. This suggestion is supported by research which 
demonstrated that whereas ideological conservatives tend to endorse genetic rather than 
social explanations for racial and class-related differences (e.g., intelligence, drive, 
violence) more than liberals, the opposite is true for sexual orientation (Suhay & 
Jayaratne, 2012). Thus, people may also use etiological explanations for group 
differences strategically rather than blindly apply broad theories about the role of genes 
in explaining human behavior.  
The somewhat mixed pattern of causal effects of genetic attributions on attitudes 
towards LGB individuals and/or causes may also arise from the tension between different 
genetic essentialist biases. On the one hand, in line with attribution theory (Weiner, 
Perry, & Magnusson, 1988) and empirical evidence (e.g., Cheung & Heine, 2016; Dar-
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Nimrod et al., 2011), the immutability bias reduces perception of culpability; thus among 
those who view homosexuality as negative, endorsing relevant genetic explanations 
should lead them to assign less blame and harbor less negative attitudes. Similarly, a 
natural bias can further lead people to assume that homosexuality is more natural if it has 
a genetic basis, which would lead to more tolerant attitudes. On the other hand, the 
discreteness bias increases perceptions of distinctness between a heterosexual individual 
and a homosexual outgroup member, which is likely to lead to more negative attitudes. 
Such opposing pulls from the different biases are supported by research that indicated 
that whereas perceptions of increased immutability were predictive of reduced anti-gay 
attitudes, perceptions of discreteness of male homosexuality were a positive predictor of 
anti-gay attitudes (Haslam & Levy, 2007).  
Whereas much research was conducted on the relations between essentialist 
beliefs and attitudes towards LGB individuals among heterosexual individuals, only 
recently has research began to examine the nature of such relationships among LGB 
individuals themselves. Some scholars (e.g., LeVay, 1996) predicted that LGB 
individuals’ endorsement of genetic explanations for homosexuality will result in positive 
consequences; however, empirical research delivers a more nuanced picture. Recent 
studies do suggest that essentialist beliefs about sexual orientation have implications 
among LGB individuals as well. Just as heterosexual individuals show clashing effects 
among their essentialist biases and attitudes towards homosexuality, the different aspects 
of essentialism also conflict among LGB individuals (Morandini, Blaszczynski, Costa, & 
Dar-Nimrod, 2016; Morandini, Blaszczynski, Ross, Costa, & Dar-Nimrod, 2015). For 
example, those LGB individuals who view sexual orientation as biologically-based or 
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immutable tend to experience less sexual orientation uncertainty (which positively 
predicts wellbeing). On the other hand, gay men and bisexual women who perceive 
sexual orientation as existing in discrete typologies report more internalized anti-
gay/bisexual attitudes (Morandini et al., 2016; Morandini et al., 2015). Among gay men, 
this may be because discreteness beliefs sharpen the distinction between straight vs. gay 
identified individuals, leading to increased self-stereotyping and increased feelings of 
marginalization or otherness. In contrast, bisexual women, who have flexible patterns of 
sexual attraction and therefore more amorphous sexual attraction boundaries, do not show 
this effect. There is also evidence that sexual orientation beliefs are connected to an 
individual’s experience of sexual orientation. Lesbian women who report being 
exclusively same-sex attracted are more likely to view sexual orientation as biologically 
determined, immutable, and discrete, than lesbian women who are non-exclusively 
attracted to women (Morandini et al., 2016). As empirical research on this topic is just 
emerging, it is still unclear whether sexual orientation beliefs are formed by reflecting on 
the nature of one’s own sexuality or adopting perceived LGB community or broader 
societal zeitgeists. Regardless, these findings suggest that essentialist beliefs may be 
utilized to satisfy personalized epistemic needs, as suggested by Cheung, Dar-Nimrod, 
and Gonsalkorale (2014). 
2.3 Health 
A key impetus underlying the scientific quest to identify genes has been to 
improve people’s health. An example of this quest can be seen in the sequence of three 
DNA bases, cytosine-adenine-guanine (CAG), which gets translated into the amino 
acid glutamine. Located along chromosome 4’s short arm, the wild-type (normal) form of 
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the HTT gene contains between 6 and 35 such CAG repeats. However, among about 50 
to 100 individuals of every million people, the number of these CAG repeats is greater 
than 40. For those individuals, the protein that the HTT gene produces leads to 
devastating outcomes; unless these individuals die at an early age, they will develop a 
ruinous disease, Huntington’s disease, that will ravage their cognitive capabilities, 
personality, and physicality, ultimately leading to their untimely death (e.g., Andrew et 
al., 1993). The number of CAG repeats does not only foretell whether one will or will not 
develop Huntington’s, it also predicts, with remarkable precision, the age of onset of 
visible symptoms and, by extension, longevity (Walker, 2007).  
The deterministic nature of the effects of the HTT gene shares many features with 
lay conceptualizations of destiny, but these kinds of fully penetrant monogenic disease 
risk variants represent a small minority of humanity’s disease burden. That said, many of 
the more common causes of death such as heart disease, diabetes, or various forms of 
cancer are directly influenced by genetics and/or are indirectly affected by genetic 
influences on relevant health behaviors (such as smoking or caloric intake). The influence 
of one’s genes on health has been widely acknowledged for decades (e.g., Herzlich, 
1973), and evidence of such common attributions also emerges in response to questions 
about specific conditions/illnesses such as alcoholism (e.g., Keller, 2005), obesity (e.g., 
Dar-Nimrod, Cheung et al., 2014), cancer (e.g., de Vries, Mesters, Van de Steeg, & 
Honing, 2005), or mental illness (e.g., Schomerus et al., 2012), to name a few. Although 
such genetic associations for common diseases do indeed exist, they can best be 
understood as exemplars of weak genetic explanation, in that they are the product of 
many, many genes interacting with each other and with numerous environmental and 
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psychosocial influences. Notwithstanding such complex networks of interacting 
etiologies, our essentialist biases make us prone to understanding disease risk in more 
deterministic ways. This raises the question of how people understand health outcomes if 
they are made aware of relevant genetic underpinnings. Specifically, how do genetic 
attributions affect the ways that people: a) form attitudes towards those afflicted with 
particular conditions; b) assess risk and personal control; and c) ultimately behave?  
Consider the role of genetic attributions in how people make sense of mental 
illnesses and those afflicted by them. Much evidence supports a substantial heritable 
component for all common psychopathologies, but actual determinist links between 
specific genetic variants and mental health conditions are limited to rare syndromes 
(WHO, 2001). Despite the general lack of substantial genetic risk predictors for mental 
health outcomes, much evidence suggests that people are affected by considering the role 
of genes in mental illness. One source of evidence for the ways that people understand 
genetic causes of mental illnesses can be seen in efforts by various advocacy groups to 
reduce mental health stigma. Such advocacy groups often emphasize genetic and 
biological causes of common psychopathologies to reinforce their agenda, hoping that 
offering biological explanations will reduce stigma (e.g., Phelan, Cruz-Rojas, & Reiff, 
2002). And indeed, research shows that people are less likely to blame individuals for 
their unwarranted symptomatic behaviors in the face of biological/genetic explanations 
(e.g., Phelan, 2005; Phelan et al., 2002). For schizophrenia, the most studied illness in 
this context, a meta-analysis indicates that biological/genetic explanations reliably predict 
less stigma and blame (Kvaale, Gottdiener, & Haslam, 2013). However, a closer look at 
the meta-analysis on the relations between these constructs suggests evidence for the 
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double-edged sword of genetic essentialism. That is, although biological/genetic 
explanations may reduce blame, they are also associated with a modest increase in the 
perceived dangerousness of patients and a desire for greater social distance from the 
sufferers (Kvaale et al., 2013). On the one hand, the immutability bias implies reduced 
control by the actor and thus reduced blame, and the natural bias suggests that the illness 
is more acceptable and less stigmatizing. On the other hand, the discreteness bias 
highlights how the afflicted individuals are fundamentally different from others, making 
them a target for discrimination. Moreover, the sense of reduced control that comes with 
the immutability bias suggests that the individual may be unable to prevent themselves 
from engaging in behaviors that are dangerous to others. In addition, the specific etiology 
bias also raises the specter that the individual will never be free of their condition, thus 
leading to more pessimistic prognoses (Kvaale et al., 2013; Lebowitz, Ahn, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2013). Thus, endorsing genetic explanations for mental illnesses yields 
decidedly mixed effects for how people view those with psychopathologies (Kvaale et al., 
2013; Lebowitz & Ahn, 2014; Phelan et al., 2002). Although psychopathology is the 
most prominent topic in which perceptions of undesirable health-related symptoms as an 
outcome of biological/genetic explanations have been studied, similar essentialist 
tensions have been found in research on prenatal genetic testing (e.g., Blumberg, 1994; 
Kelly, 2009), smoking (e.g., Dar-Nimrod, Zuckerman, & Duberstein, 2014; Tercyak, 
Peshkin, Wine, & Walker, 2006), alcoholism (Dar-Nimrod, Zuckerman, & Duberstein, 
2013), memory loss (Lineweaver, Bondi, Galasko, & Salmon, 2014), and overeating 
(Monterosso et al., 2005). 
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Genetic essentialist biases are implicated in a wide array of health behaviors, but 
they are not limited to questions of whether a relevant behavior occurs (e.g., abstaining 
from unhealthy eating, performing well on a memory test); they may also affect which of 
several competing behavioral options is chosen as a goal. If an unhealthy behavior is seen 
as “genetic,” it is often presumed that biomedical interventions targeting genes would be 
appropriate to modify the behavior, while lifestyle interventions would not, in line with 
the specific etiology essentialist bias. Empirical evidence demonstrates that exposure to 
genetic attributions indeed increases preferences for physiological interventions to 
mitigate unhealthy behaviors or improve disease outcomes (e.g., Lebowitz & Ahn, 2014; 
Phelan, Yang, & Cruz-Rojas, 2006). For example, Wright, Weinman, and Marteau (2003) 
asked smokers to imagine being tested for genetic susceptibility to nicotine dependence. 
Half of the participants were told to imagine receiving a positive indication for genetic 
susceptibility and half were told to imagine receiving a negative indication. Respondents 
in the positive group were more likely to endorse medication as an effective means of 
smoking cessation than those in the negative group. In addition, smokers in the positive 
group were more likely to say they believed willpower to be less effective as a method of 
smoking cessation, demonstrating a potentially damaging effect of the specific etiology 
bias.   
2.4 Race and Ancestry.   
Research on population genetics has provided evidence for the intersection of two 
rather obvious and widely shared intuitions: 1) people inherit traits (and genes) from their 
biological parents, and 2) people’s mating preferences are not determined randomly. 
Although there are several factors that guide the way that people choose their mates, one 
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particularly powerful factor rarely gets discussed, perhaps because it seems to go without 
saying. The propinquity effect refers to the fact that people are far more likely to form 
relationships with people who are geographically near than with those who are 
geographically distant (Festinger, Schacter, & Back, 1950), and this also holds true for 
mating. A key genetic consequence of this effect is that genetic variants tend to cluster 
geographically. This clustering occurs for two reasons. First, selection pressures can 
leave adaptive alleles more common in certain regions, such as how an allele of gene 
SLC24A5, which is associated with lighter skin color, became more common in areas of 
higher latitude, as it was adaptive for people in those regions to absorb more ultraviolet 
radiation to catalyze the production of vitamin D (Lamason et al., 2005). Second, random 
genetic drift will lead some neutral alleles to proliferate in certain areas because those 
who had more offspring in a particular region will have their own genetic variants 
become relatively more common in subsequent generations. For example, the population 
of Norfolk Island has a number of genetic risk factors for cardiovascular disease that are 
more common than average because they descend from a small group of individuals who 
must have carried the same mutations (Bellis et al., 2005). Natural selection and genetic 
drift result in the frequencies of different alleles varying significantly around the world.  
The uneven distribution of alleles across the globe makes it possible to identify 
the geographic origins of one’s ancestors to a fair degree of precision by examining their 
genomes. For example, one study investigated a few thousand Europeans and was able to 
predict the location, within 310 kilometers of precision, of the birthplace of 
approximately 50% of the participants by only examining the single-nucleotide 
polymorphisms of their autosomal DNA (Novembre et al., 2008). More pertinent to the 
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theme of this chapter is the question of whether learning about the geographic 
distribution of genes affects the way that people understand themselves and others. There 
are numerous anecdotal accounts of the ways that people have experienced changes in 
their identity as a result of encountering unexpected genomic ancestry information, which 
has now been provided to over 3 million people through DTC genomics companies 
(Petrone, 2015). As an example of the effects of genes on identity, consider the case of 
Csanád Szegedi; he was elected to the European Parliament as a leading member of the 
anti-Semitic Jobbik party in 2009. However, upon unexpectedly learning that his 
maternal grandmother was Jewish, he became an Orthodox Jew in 2013 (Applebaum, 
2013).  
Although the kind of abrupt transformation exhibited by Szegedi is certainly 
unusual, many people do seem to experience a change in identity upon receiving 
unexpected information from their genomes. Roth and Lyon (in press) contacted more 
than 600 individuals who received genomic ancestry information from DTC companies. 
Among those who responded, only 26.1% reported that the test results had no impact on 
how they identify with their race or ethnicity, their identity more generally, or their 
activities or friendships. The vast majority claimed that the tests had an impact on some 
aspect of their lives. For example, upon receiving their genetic feedback some people 
began learning an ancestral language, chose new ethnic categories on the census, cheered 
for new teams in the World Cup, made new groups of friends, joined native tribes, and 
began to think of their identities differently. It should be noted that the ancestry 
information provided by DTC companies suffers from overpromising, is often full of 
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errors, and is currently not subject to any oversight or regulation (Bolnick et al., 2007; 
Heine, 2017; Royal et al., 2009). 
Setting aside the question of how learning about the geographic ancestry of one’s 
own genes affects an individual, one may also examine how learning about the 
geographic distribution of genes in general affects people. Reflecting on how genetic 
variants are distributed unequally across the globe would seem to resonate with the 
essentialist bias of conceiving of essences as carving nature at its joints. It highlights that 
humanity does not share a uniform genome, but that people from different regions of the 
globe have some identifiable genetic differences. Considering the genetic boundaries that 
partition the world may therefore lead people to conclude that people of different 
ethnicities have distinctive essences. And because a key component of ethnic prejudice is 
that it’s founded on the sense that outgroups are of a different essence than ingroups 
(Allport, 1954; Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille, 2004), this raises the possibility that 
reflecting on the geographic distribution of genes may exacerbate feelings of prejudice. 
 There is considerable evidence for this effect. In a study by Keller (2005), 
German students were asked to read an essay that described how geographic ancestry can 
be revealed by one’s genome or a control essay on an unrelated topic. Later, participants 
were asked questions about expanding the European Union and were asked to indicate 
their feelings towards people from various Western European countries and Eastern 
European countries. The results indicated that those who read about the geographic 
distribution of genes showed a larger ingroup bias in preferring Western Europeans over 
Eastern Europeans compared with those who read the control essay. Likewise, people 
who were exposed to arguments that the human population’s genome varied significantly 
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evaluated ingroup and outgroup faces in a more dichotomous way compared with those 
who read that human genetic variation is minimal (Plaks, Malahy, Sedlins, & Shoda, 
2012; see also Kang, Plaks, & Remedios, 2015). Moreover, Kimel, Huesmann, Kunst, 
and Halperin (2016) compared how American Jewish participants responded to an essay 
outlining how Jews and Arabs were highly genetically similar in contrast to those who 
read either an essay arguing that Jews and Arabs were genetically distinct or a control 
essay. Those who read about the genetic similarities between Jews and Arabs were more 
in support of peacemaking efforts in the Middle East than those who read either of the 
other two essays. Given that the human genome is remarkably homogenous in contrast to 
many other species (Templeton, 2013) – for example, whereas genetic variation 
associated with the continental races accounts for only about 4.3% of human genetic 
variability (Rosenberg et al., 2002), the different “races” of chimpanzees account for 
30.1% of chimpanzee genetic variability (Gonder et al., 2011) – perhaps getting this 
message out will lead to less ethnic prejudice more generally. 
The genetic essentialist bias of seeing populations with different genes as being 
more discrete from each other can also interact with our other essentialist bias of seeing 
genetic causes as being of a specific etiology. That is, upon seeing phenotypic variation 
between human populations, people may conclude, erroneously, that genotypic 
differences between the populations must account for this. For example, this was a key 
argument of the controversial book, The Bell Curve, in noting that because African-
Americans and European-Americans performed differently on some kinds of intellectual 
tasks, the difference in performance could be explained by imagined genes that 
distinguished these two populations (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). Given how this notion 
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resonates so well with our essentialist biases, it’s worth noting that just because genes 
may account for individual variability in a trait, this says nothing about whether genes 
underlie between-group variability in the same trait (for thoughtful discussion of this 
issue, see Nisbett, 2009).  
The degree to which people see population differences, such as those described in 
The Bell Curve, as having a genetic basis is something that we recently investigated 
(Schmalor, Cheung, & Heine, 2016). American MTurk participants were randomly 
assigned to read an essay either about a geographic distribution of genes, a description of 
human genetic homogeneity, or a control topic. They were presented with a list of ethnic 
stereotypes that covered a wide range of desirability (e.g., French have a more 
sophisticated palate; Africans have a better sense of rhythm; Asians are worse drivers). 
Participants were asked how accurate and how offensive they found the stereotypes, and 
then they were asked to indicate what percent of the population variability could be 
attributed to genes or experiences. On average, people viewed approximately 35% of the 
variability underlying these stereotypes as genetic. However, those who read about the 
geographic distribution of genes estimated that genes accounted for approximately 5% 
more of the population variability in comparison with the other two groups. That is, when 
people considered the argument that people vary in their genes around the world, they 
viewed genes to be a more significant component underlying ethnic stereotypes 
compared with those who did not encounter this argument. 
 This tendency towards seeing population differences on complex traits as an 
outcome of underlying genetic variability speaks to the controversy over what entails 
race. Is race something that is largely socially constructed, or is it grounded in biology? 
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Although it is tempting to see race as biologically grounded, given the visible differences 
across the continental races, there is a strong consensus among both biologists and social 
scientists that race is something that is socially constructed rather than biologically based 
(Bliss, 2012; Boas, 1940; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 2003; Hunley, Healy, & Long, 
2009; Lewontin, 1972; Yudell, Roberts, DeSalle, & Tishkoff, 2016). Biologists maintain 
a set of criteria for identifying whether a population can be considered a sub-species (the 
non-human equivalent of race), and human races do not come close to meeting any of 
these criteria (Templeton, 2013). Moreover, we can see evidence of the social basis of 
race when we consider the various ways that race is defined. For example, people of 
disadvantaged races are often subject to the notion of hypodescent, where those of the 
lower-ranked ethnic groups are seen to have a contaminating influence. An extreme 
example of this was the “one drop rule,” which made the case that people would be 
deemed to be Black if they had any African blood. Evidence for hypodescent can still be 
found today; if one morphs photos of White and Black faces, people tend to identify the 
faces as Black even if the percentage of the contribution from the morphed Black photo is 
considerably less than 50% (Ho, Sidanius, Levin, & Banaji, 2011). Hypodescent reflects 
that our judgments as to what counts as being a member of the Black race is not 
proportionately based on genes. Regardless of whether human races really are socially 
constructed, however, more relevant to this chapter is the question of how people respond 
when they encounter an argument that race is grounded in one’s biology vs. social 
conventions.  
 Williams and Eberhardt (2008) investigated this question by examining how 
White American participants would respond to a video of a Black target who was 
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discussing how he had been laid off from his work. Prior to seeing the video, some 
participants had read an essay highlighting how race was a biological construct, whereas 
others read that race is a social construct. Those who read about the biological argument 
for race had more prejudiced attitudes towards a Black target than those who had read the 
social constructionist argument. Likewise, in another investigation, Asian-Americans 
who read an essay arguing for a biological account of race were found to identify less 
with American culture than those who read an essay arguing for a social basis of race 
(No, Hong, Liao, Lee, Wood, & Chao, 2008; also see Chao, Chen, Roisman, & Hong, 
2007). A perceived biological basis of race makes one’s ethnic identity appear fixed and 
responsible for characteristics of one’s ethnicity. 
2.5 Criminality 
 Academic inquiries into the biological bases of criminal behavior have long 
existed, most notably involving Cesare Lombroso’s (1876/2007) ideas about the 
physiognomy of criminality and his thesis of the “born criminal.” Although most of 
Lombroso’s ideas have not survived to the present, the underlying motivation of seeking 
a biological explanation for criminality persists. This is apparent in the appeal of the 
XYY chromosome defense that appeared in the 1960’s, whereby people believed that 
having an extra Y-chromosome predisposed men to have lower intelligence and greater 
proneness towards violence, despite a striking lack of evidence (Slabbert, 2006). More 
recently, and more germane to the central theme of this chapter, results from the Human 
Genome Project and advances in behavioral genetics have tantalized the public and 
researchers with the possibility that criminal behavior may be distilled down to one’s 
genetic makeup (Friedland, 1998). Whereas criminality is most certainly a product of a 
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complex interplay of both genetic and non-genetic factors (Alper, 1998), the scientific 
community has made great strides towards identifying various genetic markers that 
correlate with criminal or aggressive behavior (for a summary, see Beaver, Schwartz, & 
Gajos, 2015). 
 The fact that researchers are discovering genetic components of criminal behavior 
is helpful for our understanding of human behavior and for the accumulation of scientific 
knowledge. However, an important issue that these findings pose for the legal community 
is how members of the criminal justice system, both laypeople and experts, interpret and 
make use of such findings. One important tenet of the criminal justice system is that it 
assumes that people act out of free will, and that criminal deeds are the product of one’s 
willful intent to act in contravention to the law. This is encapsulated in the core concept 
of mens rea, or “guilty mind,” referring to one’s mental state and volitional control 
during the commission of the crime (Aharoni, Funk, Sinnott-Armstrong, & Gazzaniga, 
2008). The immutability bias, however, undermines this inference, which may engender 
the perception that “criminal genes” inevitably lead to criminal behavior, ultimately 
prompting mitigated judicial outcomes. The recognition of such biases has led to an 
ongoing debate amongst legal scholars regarding the place that genetic evidence has 
within the courtroom, particularly given that individual genes can generally only account 
for a very small proportion of the variability for a given phenotype (Baum, 2013; 
Berryessa & Cho, 2013; Chabris et al., 2015).  
 Emerging evidence over the last decade has shown that genetic explanations of 
criminality lead members of the criminal justice system to think in ways consistent with 
genetic essentialist biases, in contrast to non-genetic, particularly environmental, 
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explanations of criminality. In terms of impacting perceptions of a criminal, genetic 
explanations lead people to attribute less behavioral control to the perpetrator and less 
willful intention in terms of committing various crimes, relative to environmental 
explanations, reflecting the genetic essentialist bias of immutability (Cheung & Heine, 
2015; Dar-Nimrod et al., 2011). Furthermore, people feel that such explanations of 
criminality are more persuasive and acceptable as excuses in criminal cases, compared to 
more experiential explanations such as exposure to violence or parental abuse (Heath, 
Stone, Darley, & Grannemann, 2003), leading them to perceive lower levels of overall 
criminal culpability (see also Monterosso et al., 2005). As a result, genetic explanations 
of criminal behavior lead people to be more accepting of insanity and diminished 
capacity defenses and to prescribe shorter prison sentences (Cheung & Heine, 2015), in 
accordance with the fact that such explanations appear to mitigate many concepts that are 
relevant for mens rea, including perceived control and intention (Dar-Nimrod et al., 
2011) – a finding that generalizes even to state trial judges and Superior Court Judges 
(Aspinwall, Brown, & Tabery, 2012; Berryessa, in press).  
 As noted in previous sections, the same genetic essentialist biases that underlie 
the mitigating perceptions resulting from genetic explanations for criminal behavior may 
also lead to aggravating perceptions. For instance, expecting a deterministic relation 
between genetic causes and criminal behavior leads people to engage in more stable 
causal attributions and expect a greater likelihood of recidivism (Cheung & Heine, 2015). 
This creates an enhanced perception that the criminal is dangerous, engendering greater 
levels of fear towards the criminal (Appelbaum & Scurich, 2013). Importantly, both the 
mitigating and aggravating perceptions of the criminal factor into people’s prescribed 
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prison sentences – in opposite directions. In other words, mitigating perceptions (e.g., 
less ascriptions of behavioral control) predict shorter prison sentences, whereas 
aggravating perceptions (e.g., greater expectations of recidivism) predict lengthier prison 
sentences (Cheung & Heine, 2015). These responses suggest that people’s objectives for 
punishment may be influenced by the kinds of explanations that they encounter. Genetic 
explanations trigger people’s concerns about incapacitation and protection of the public 
as an objective for punishment, rather than deterrence, rehabilitation, or just deserts 
(Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Pinker, 2011). Overall, the extant data suggest 
that people have a double-edged perception of genetic causes for criminality, similar to 
their effects on evaluations of individuals with a psychopathology, leading to both 
mitigating and aggravating perceptions.  
2.6 Political Orientation 
From its inception, political psychology has focused on individual differences 
associated with variations in political affiliation. In the wake of WWII, these efforts took 
on greater urgency as psychologists turned to the emerging field of personality research 
to determine what, if any, core psychological mechanisms underlie adherence to fascist 
ideology, and extreme right-wing beliefs more generally. The first of these “political 
personality” constructs was outlined in The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson, Sanford, & Nevitt, 1950), which featured proposed dimensions of 
right-wing ideology that would be reified over the course of the century: conventionalism 
and anti-intellectualism, which represent resistance to social change, and submission to 
authority, with a corresponding preference for social hierarchy (also see Right-wing 
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Authoritarianism, Altemeyer 1981; and Social Dominance Orientation, Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).  
Many psychologists have intuited that fundamental biological differences 
undergird these personality constructs, which in turn are influenced by genetic factors 
(e.g., “Politics might not be in our souls, but it probably is in our DNA”; Hibbing, Smith, 
& Alford, 2014, p. 298). Initial evidence for this genetic influence came from twin 
studies suggesting a moderate degree of heritability (Martin, Eaves, Heath, Jardine, 
Feingold, & Eysenck, 1986; Olson et al., 2001). Using more powerful statistical 
techniques, subsequent research has supported the contention that social value adherence 
is partly heritable, along with the degree to which these values are maintained, even if the 
same cannot be said for specific political party affiliation (Alford, Funk & Hibbing, 2005; 
Hatemi, Alford, Hibbing, Martin, & Eaves, 2008).  
In recent years, these apparent links have spurred efforts to specify shared genetic 
markers underlying a possible conservative phenotype (Deppe, Stoltenberg, Smith, & 
Hibbing 2013; Fowler & Dawes, 2008). In particular, these efforts have focused on the 
potential genetic underpinnings of a purported “negativity bias” demonstrated by 
ideological conservatives (e.g., Hibbing et al., 2014, p. 22; but note a critical review of 
this argument, Charney & English, 2012). From this general perspective, political 
conservatism is itself seen as a genetically evolved response to threatening or uncertainty 
arousing stimuli (e.g., Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), which plays a role in 
both dimensions of conservatism as it is classically defined. First, a resistance to social 
change - and change, more generally – has been claimed to be the product of a relatively 
diminished neural response to error feedback that would motivate behavioral change (Jost 
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& Amodio, 2013) caused by relatively decreased brain mass in areas associated with 
cognitive conflict detection (e.g., anterior cingulate cortex, KanaI, Feilden, Firth, & Rees, 
2011). Second, a preference for social hierarchy has been argued to follow from the 
relative proclivity of conservatives to attend more (e.g., Dodd, Balzer, Jacobs, 
Gruszdzynski, Smith, & Hibbing, 2012) and respond more strongly (Oxley et al., 2008) 
to aversive stimuli, and this bias has been implicated in the heightened derogation of 
perceived social outgroups (e.g., heightened disgust and attitudes towards gay men; 
Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009).  
 The reporting of this research has been widespread, with a particular emphasis on 
public dissemination of findings that suggest a genetically determined biological origin to 
political affiliation (e.g., Hibbing, Smith, & Alford 2013). As we have discussed, 
attributing genetic origins to criminality (e.g., Cheung & Heine, 2015) and sexual 
orientation (e.g., Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2008) may indeed increase tolerance for 
behaviors that are otherwise stigmatized, as these behaviors are seen as immutable and 
natural. Similarly, Hibbing et al. (2014) emphasize that the genetic basis of political 
differences should lead to increased understanding and acceptance. However, recall the 
tension we have identified in previous sections between the immutability and naturalness 
biases on the one hand, and the discreteness bias on the other hand. This latter bias 
suggests that the manner in which genetic attributions are portrayed in the “political 
genetics” literature could facilitate intolerance of political outgroups by highlighting how 
those with conflicting political views are ultimately made up of different underlying 
essences.  
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Political affiliations are often portrayed in a manner that emphasizes and 
exaggerates the extent to which they are bounded, immutable, genetically determined 
categories. “Conservatives” and “liberals” are described with discrete nouns, and as 
manifestations of homogenous natural kinds that ultimately originate “in our DNA” 
(Hibbing et al., 2014, p. 298). In reality, however, ideological commitments vary 
continuously across whatever dimensions they happen to be operationalized by, and are, 
at best, marginally related to contemporary measures of genetic influence (Charney & 
English, 2012; Hibbing et al., 2013). Regardless, the commonly misapplied genetic 
attributions may motivate individuals to perceive those who predominantly identify with 
an opposing ideology in a manner that would discourage efforts to seek common ground, 
as they are understood to possess a fundamentally divergent essence. Similarly, efforts 
towards meaningful engagement with perceived political outgroups may seem pointless 
to the extent that ideologies are understood as immutable natural categories that resist 
social influence as they spring from a specific etiology. 
 Relative to liberals, genetic attributions may especially decrease tolerance towards 
conservatives, as the natural origin of conservatism is sometimes depicted as an atavistic 
response to disgust and fear (e.g., Jost et al., 2003), shaped by diminished brain structures 
associated with higher cognitive function, and exaggerated brain structures associated 
with threat detection (e.g., Kanai et al., 2011). In this depiction, the genetic pathways 
underlying conservatism were selected for during the Pleistocene epoch (Pinker, 2012), 
when primitive man faced constant mortal threat, in contrast to the present day. As such, 
conservative genetic markers may be regarded as an evolutionary dead-end, insofar as 
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“strong negativity biases were once selected for but now are not” (Hibbing et al., 2014, p. 
32) – a depiction that resonates with eugenic beliefs, as we discuss in the next section. 
 Despite the prevalence of this depiction in popular discourse (e.g., Mooney, 
2012), there is relatively little research that assesses the extent to which genetic 
attributions for political affiliations decrease ideological tolerance or increase political 
discourse (Hibbing et al., 2014). In one recent study (Suhay, Brandt, & Proulx, in press), 
measures of genetic attributions for ideology (e.g., “A person’s political beliefs are 
determined by their genetics”) were inversely correlated to items that assessed tolerance 
of those with divergent political identities (e.g., “I often spend time with people who have 
political beliefs different from my own”) among both liberals and conservatives. 
Moreover, this heightened ideological discrimination was especially prevalent among 
political liberals, which may be due to the explicitly negative portrayal of conservative 
genetics. These perceptions may play a role in the generally negative (Duarte et al., 2014) 
and discriminatory (Inbar & Lammers, 2014) attitudes towards conservatives among 
ideologically liberal social scientists. 
2.7 Essences and Eugenics 
Considering a genetic foundation for human traits does not just affect how we 
think about those specific traits. It is also implicated in broader efforts to change those 
traits. Here we consider what is arguably the most pronounced cost of our genetic 
essentialist leanings – it can be associated with support for eugenic social policies. 
While eugenics may be associated primarily with the horrors of Nazi Germany 
and the holocaust, this social philosophy had much broader support prior to WWII. 
Indeed, discussions in favor of eugenics were commonplace throughout the industrialized 
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world in the early 20th century, as the logic that governed the breeding choices made by 
livestock breeders began to be applied to humans (for reviews, see Kevles, 1995; Paul, 
1995). Some efforts were termed positive eugenics, in the sense that those who were seen 
as possessing good genes were encouraged to spread their bounty to the next generation. 
For example, “Fitter family” contests were held in state fairs in the US, where medals 
were given to those designated as “Grade A Individuals,” alongside the other prize-
winning livestock (Kevles, 1992). But these efforts were soon overtaken by much wider 
scale programs of negative eugenics, where the goal was to prevent the unfit from 
breeding. In the US, the popular descriptor for the unfit was “feeble-minded,” a catch-all 
term that included any kind of perceived defect in intelligence or moral character. 
Negative eugenics was championed by a variety of progressive organizations, such as the 
Sierra Club and Planned Parenthood, as both sought the goal of reducing the world’s 
population by preventing births among the unfit (Paul, 1995; Stern, 2005). The eugenics 
movement cut across the political spectrum, and was championed both by those on the 
right, who sought to increase the relative proportion of their own kind, and by the left, 
who viewed it as a necessary pillar for the establishment of a social welfare state 
(Spektorowski & Ireni-Saban, 2013). Mandatory sterilization was legalized in 1927 in the 
US, which led to the forceful sterilization of more than 60,000 Americans, 
disproportionately minorities and women (Stern, 2005). Similar mandatory sterilization 
programs emerged across the industrialized world, in such diverse places as Canada, 
Sweden, Japan, and much of Latin America (Broberg & Roll-Hansen, 1996; Robertson, 
2001; Stepan, 1991). These efforts rendered the decision of who would have children to 
rest ultimately with the state. 
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Support for eugenics was embraced by leading Western politicians (e.g., Winston 
Churchill, Tommy Douglas, Teddy Roosevelt) and public intellectuals at the time (e.g., 
Alexander Graham Bell, W. E. Dubois, George Bernard Shaw, H.G. Wells; Kevles, 1995; 
Paul, 1995). But two disciplines stand out in their support for eugenics: First, psychology 
played an outsized role in the movement (which has received relatively little attention 
within the field), as the metric of genetic quality that was most widely targeted was IQ, 
and many psychologists were active in promoting eugenic policies to improve national 
IQ, including Carl Brigham, James McKeen Cattell, Robert Fisher, G. Stanley Hall, Karl 
Pearson, Charles Spearman, Lewis Terman, Edward Thorndike, and Robert Yerkes 
(Heine, 2017). Second, and most pertinent to the logic of genetic essentialism, was that 
eugenic support was widespread at the time among geneticists. Prior to the war, there was 
scant light that separated the fledgling field of human genetics from eugenics – indeed, 
the latter was often thought of as applied genetics (Paul, 1995). Evidence for this link can 
be seen from a variety of sources. For example, the founder of behavioral genetics, 
Francis Galton, was also the father of modern eugenics (Galton, 1875, 1883). Likewise, 
in 1916, every member of the founding editorial board of the journal, Genetics, endorsed 
the eugenics movement (Ludmerer, 1972). The link between the two fields is also evident 
in that half of academic biologists in Germany joined the Nazi party prior to the war, 
which was the largest representation of any professional group (Paul, 1995).  
One reason that there was such a link between the study of genetics and eugenics 
in the early 20th century was that many early geneticists favored simple Mendelian 
accounts of human traits. For example, Charles B. Davenport, the leading American 
eugenicist at this time, maintained that many human traits, included feeble-mindedness, a 
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love for the sea, nomadism, shiftlessness, and innate eroticism were the product of single 
genes (Comfort, 2012; Kevles, 1995). To the extent that human traits could be viewed as 
simple and direct consequences of single genes, it is far more straightforward to imagine 
efforts to change the frequency of desired traits through controlled breeding.  
We have investigated whether similarly deterministic perceptions of genetic 
causes predict support for eugenic ideas today. We created a scale to measure support for 
eugenic policies (Heine, Cheung, & Ream, 2015). It includes items such as “There should 
be laws discouraging people with low intelligence from having biological children,” and 
“Anyone convicted of a violent crime should be sterilized as part of their punishment.” 
We correlated this scale with the Belief in Genetic Determinism Scale (Keller, 2005) and 
the GETS (Dar-Nimrod et al., 2016). Support for eugenic policies correlated moderately 
positively with these measures of genetic determinism/essentialism (Heine, Cheung, & 
Ream, 2015). Moreover, the link between eugenics and simple accounts of genetic 
understanding was further demonstrated in that we found negative correlations between 
eugenics support and knowledge of genetics (operationalized either in terms of the 
number of genetics classes taken, or in terms of performance on a genetics knowledge 
test; Ream, Cheung, & Heine, 2016). These findings reveal that those who are more 
likely to understand the irreducibly complex ways that genotypes get translated into 
phenotypes are less in support of efforts by the state to improve the collective genome 
through strategic breeding.  
2.8 Genetic Engineering 
Studying the predictors of support for eugenics may seem like an outdated 
question, akin, perhaps, to investigating present day support for slavery. But with the 
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rapid advent of several new genetic technologies, the idea of improving the genes of 
current and future generations has re-emerged as a topic of public discourse (e.g., Hudson 
& Scott, 2002; Winkelman, Missmer, Myers, & Ginsburg, 2015). However, in contrast to 
the early 20th century when the state was petitioned to lead efforts to enhance a nation’s 
collective genome, this time eugenics is emerging through the backdoor (Duster, 2003). 
There are presently a variety of genetic technologies that are available for parents to 
make their own reproductive decisions which can potentially shape posterity (see Heine, 
2017, for a review). Some of these technologies allow for the genes of fetuses to be 
genotyped (e.g., amniocentesis, chorionic callus sampling, cell-free fetal DNA 
screening), and thereby providing the parents with information about potential congenital 
disorders which may lead them to decide to terminate a pregnancy. Another alternative is 
to genotype a series of fertilized embryos using preimplantation genetic diagnosis, and 
then select to implant those in the womb that are not carriers of particular alleles 
associated with genetic diseases, or even to select the sex of one’s baby. Parents can also 
select from sperm and egg donors, while perusing remarkably detailed catalogues 
describing the donors’ phenotypes. If this was done on a large scale, it could shape the 
collective genome because people seek different traits when selecting gamete donors than 
they do when selecting romantic partners – when people select donors, they place 
relatively greater weight on their health, attractiveness, height, and various abilities, 
whereas when choosing romantic partners, people place relatively greater weight on 
character (Scheib, 1994; Scheib, Kristiansen, & Wara, 1997). Moreover, there is much 
fear over novel technologies that have not yet been used to create a human, such as 
cloning, or creating designer babies using genome editing by way of CRISPR/Cas9. In 
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contrast to the negative relation between genetic knowledge and support for eugenic 
policies, there is a weak positive relation between genetic knowledge and support for new 
reproductive technologies to enhance the genomes of future children (Ream et al., 2016). 
But overall, these technologies strike many as deeply problematic, with a commonly 
expressed concern that these entail people playing God (Calnan, Montaner, & Horne, 
2005; Condit, 2010; Winkelman et al., 2015). Moreover, aside from screening fetuses for 
congenital disorders, the other reproductive technologies are not yet commonly practiced. 
Another aspect of genetic engineering is far more common in our lives. 
Genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) now play a substantial role in our diets. 
Approximately 80% of American processed food contains at least some GMOs (Lemaux, 
2008). Yet, despite the pervasiveness of this technology, it remains bothersome to many: 
approximately three quarters of Americans are concerned with having GMOs in the food 
supply (Harmon, 2014), and approximately 70% of GMO opponents view GMOs as 
absolute moral violations (Scott, Inbar, & Rozin, in press) – that is, they are opposed to 
them regardless of any documented benefits or harms that they might entail. GMOs seem 
bothersome because they violate the essentialist bias of genes as natural. A frequent 
criticism is that GMOs are abominations, and that they represent people playing God 
(Condit, 2010). Likewise, GMOs run afoul of our essentialist biases as genes carving 
nature at its joints. For example, people are more bothered by GMOs that involve 
transgenic modifications (i.e., introducing genes from unrelated species, such as a tomato 
receiving a gene from a fish) than they are of those involving cisgenic modifications (i.e., 
introducing genes from a related species, such as an orange receiving a gene from a 
lemon; Gaskell et al., 2010).  
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In general, people have a rather poor understanding of what GMOs entail; only 
57% of Americans and 36% of Europeans correctly recognized that non-GMO food 
products also contain genes (Hallman, Hebden, Aquino, Cuite, & Lang, 2003), and only 
42% of Americans were aware that the addition of a fish gene would not necessarily 
make a tomato taste fishy (Hallman, Hebden, Cuite, Aquino, & Lang, 2004). Opposition 
to GMOs is associated with a lack of genetic literacy; there is a weak positive correlation 
between performance on a test of genetic knowledge and support for GMOs (Ream et al., 
2016). Such an association seems to be telling when one considers that, in stark contrast 
to the only 36% of Americans who support GMOs, 88% of American scientists are in 
favor of the technology (Pew Research Center, 2015). It appears that much of the 
opposition towards GMOs is not based on a weighing of costs and benefits, but is 
ultimately grounded in people being disturbed about the essences of their food being 
tampered with (see also Scott et al., in press). 
3. Perniciousness of Genetic Essentialism 
 The previous sections of this chapter have shown that genetic essentialist biases 
are based on an overly simplistic understanding of genetic information, combined with a 
human tendency to imagine underlying essences, leading people to arrive at unwarranted 
conclusions and to ascribe undue inferential power to these genes. Given that many 
consequences of our genetic essentialist biases are decidedly negative, it is important that 
efforts go into reducing these biases. These efforts may be short-term or long-term, with 
most attempts falling into the latter category. As this section will demonstrate, existing 
attempts generally try to address people’s overly simplistic understanding of genes, yet 
these largely reveal the imperviousness of these biases. 
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3.1 Short-Term Efforts to Reduce Genetic Essentialism 
 Immediate efforts to eliminate genetic essentialist biases generally involve trying 
to get people to understand the complex relation between genes and their associated 
outcomes, with varying levels of success. Two ways of accomplishing this are to 
emphasize the epistatic and polygenic nature of most genetic causes, or to manipulate 
people’s perception of the strength of a genetic effect. For example, Cheung (2016) 
sought to contrast how people would respond in their punitive judgments of someone 
convicted of murder depending on how the genetic risk information was presented. One 
study contrasted a monogenic cause vs. a polygenic cause underlying violence. Another 
study varied the magnitude of the predictive strength of the putative violence-causing 
gene. Neither of these efforts significantly affected people’s judgments about the 
applicability of a defense of diminished responsibility. In all of these cases, people in the 
genetic risk conditions assigned less responsibility to the accused compared with those 
who instead read of an experiential cause of his crime.  
Another method of eliminating people’s specific etiological bias is to highlight 
the role of external and non-genetic factors in an effort to complicate the genetic causal 
story. The simplest method of accomplishing this is to discuss genetic causes in the 
context of interactions with the environment, downplaying the solitary role of genes. 
Current evidence is mixed on the effectiveness of this method, made more complicated 
by the fact that very little work has examined the impact of such causal interactions on 
people’s perceptions. For instance, one study found that those who read an account that 
schizophrenia was the product of both biology and environment had significantly reduced 
perceptions of danger compared with those who had learned only of a genetic account of 
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schizophrenia (Walker & Read, 2002). Extending this research to address mental health 
professionals, Lebowitz and Ahn (2014) exposed clinicians to nuanced etiological 
accounts for depression (i.e., accounts containing both biogenic and psychosocial 
explanations) with varied emphases, yielding a condition in which the clinicians read a 
predominantly biological/genetic account and a condition in which they read a 
predominantly psychosocial account. They found that compared with clinicians in the 
predominantly psychosocial condition, clinicians in the predominantly biological/genetic 
condition assessed medication as more effective and psychotherapy as less effective.  
However, other research has found that people’s stigma towards mental illness did 
not differ significantly between thinking about mental illness as being due to biological 
causes versus a gene-by-environment interaction (Boysen & Gabreski, 2012; also see 
Deacon & Baird, 2009). Similarly, a study on perceptions of violence found that a genetic 
account of violence elicited an equivalent response from participants as a gene-by-
environment account of violence; both conditions resulted in people judging a perpetrator 
to be less responsible for his crimes, compared with those who learned of an 
environmental account of violence (Cheung, 2016; also see Lippa & Sanderson, 2012 for 
similar findings). In sum, causal accounts that point to gene-by-environment interactions 
are not necessarily perceived much differently than purely genetic accounts. Although it 
remains possible that there may be ways of making the environmental component of the 
gene-by-environment interactions more salient to participants (as did Leibowitz & Ahn, 
2014), and that this might then weaken people’s essentialist biases, the evidence in 
support of that approach is limited at this time.  
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Optimistically, there is some evidence that certain interventions can encourage 
behaviors that are reflective of weaker genetic essentialist biases. One such relatively 
successful attempt strongly emphasizes the important role that external procedures (e.g., 
applying sunscreen) can play in dampening or controlling the likelihood that underlying 
genetic risks will be expressed (e.g., genes for melanoma), which can empower people to 
engage in more preventative measures in reducing their risks of developing melanoma 
(Taber & Aspinwall, 2015). This success, though, still capitalizes on one’s genetic 
essentialist biases rather than eliminating those biases, because the external procedures 
mechanically prevent the genes from expressing themselves while likely leaving much of 
the underlying biases intact. Another effective method has utilized weight gain 
prevention intervention programs that focus solely on obesogenic behaviors rather than 
addressing the potential ways that genetic causes underlie obesity (McVay, Steinberg, 
Askew, Kaphingst, & Bennett, 2015). One particularly impressive part of the success of 
this intervention is in its ability to decrease the extent to which people make genetic 
attributions for weight loss. Despite these successes, a perusal of the nature of these 
programs underscores the difficult prospects of eliminating genetic essentialist biases: 
both programs rely on a disproportionately strong emphasis on the importance of non-
genetic factors in order to overcome people’s genetic essentialist biases, speaking to the 
strength and pervasiveness of these biases. 
3.2 Long-Term Efforts 
 There are no experimental data to speak to the efficacy of long-term efforts on 
reducing genetic essentialist biases. The most promising evidence comes from work 
demonstrating that higher educational levels predict less prejudice, which is associated 
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with having a less essentialized perception of racial categories (Jayaratne et al., 2006). 
These results are echoed by the finding that people who have taken more genetic courses 
(or who perform better on a test of genetic knowledge) tend to have weaker genetic 
essentialist biases (Dar-Nimrod & Godwin, 2016; Ream, Cheung, & Heine, 2016). 
Indeed, a large-scale international comparison of primary and secondary school teachers 
found that greater levels of biological training are associated with a weaker tendency to 
appeal to genetic essentialism and innatism in understanding group differences (Castéra 
& Clément, 2014). In particular, genetics training that emphasizes the interactive role of 
genes and experiences is associated with a less deterministic understanding of genetics, 
compared with a standard Mendelian curriculum (Radick, 2016). Collectively, these 
results suggest that an effective long-term strategy for stemming genetic essentialist 
biases is to improve and increase the public’s education in terms of factual genetic 
information, which many researchers have pushed for (e.g. Burley & Harris, 1999; 
Castéra & Clément, 2014; Marks, 2009). 
In sum, the general pattern of results from existing data suggests that although 
there might be short-term avenues for reducing genetic essentialist biases, they generally 
require that genetic causes be trivialized as much as possible. The mere inclusion of 
genetic causes, even as only a part of a more sophisticated set of mechanisms that lead to 
a certain outcome, is often sufficient to trigger people’s genetic essentialist biases. One 
direction that is worth exploring is the more long-term option of ensuring that people are 
better educated on genetics so they have a more accurate understanding of the relation 
between genes and associated outcomes.  
4. Conclusion 
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 The genomic revolution has arrived, and people are encountering information 
about their own genomes and about scientific research on genetics more than ever before. 
Our review suggests that people’s robust tendency for psychological essentialism makes 
them prone to conceive of imagined essences underlying the natural world. And because 
popular conceptions of genes make them such an effective placeholder for essences 
(Medin & Ortony, 1989), we propose that when people encounter these genetic 
attributions, they tend to understand them in ways similar to how they understand 
essences; that is, genetic causes appear immutable, of a specific etiology, and natural, and 
groups that possess them appear more homogeneous and discrete. These genetic 
essentialist biases are irrational responses for understanding complex human traits, and 
they have some potent costs, as they are associated with increased racism, sexism, fears 
about people with mental illnesses, deterministic and pessimistic thoughts about disease 
prognoses, fears of recidivism among criminals, unwarranted worries about GMO food 
products, and sympathy for eugenics, among others. On the other hand, these same biases 
are associated with more tolerance and sympathy for gay rights, people with mental 
illnesses, criminals, and the potential for international peace. Regardless of the valence of 
the outcomes, these biases represent incorrect ways of understanding how genes underlie 
complex human traits.  
 There are several key questions about genetic essentialism that remain largely 
unexplored. First, the majority of the findings that we discuss come from WEIRD 
(Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) samples; do these effects 
generalize across different contexts? On the one hand, evidence for psychological 
essentialism has been found in every culture in which it has been explored thus far in 
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published studies (see Gelman, 2003; Henrich et al., 2010), and this leads us to expect 
that the effects obtained here would be broadly found across other contexts. On the other 
hand, some constructs that would seem to relate to essentialism are more pronounced in 
some cultures than in others. For example, Westerners are more likely to make 
dispositional attributions over situational attributions (e.g., Choi et al., 1999) and are 
more likely to embrace entity theories of abilities (e.g., Heine et al., 2001), in comparison 
with East Asians. These differences would suggest that the kinds of effects described in 
this chapter would be weaker in East Asian societies. For example, one study found that 
Chinese were less likely than Canadians to incorporate biological information about a 
target in their behavioral predictions for that target (Lee, 2009). Another possibility is 
that more collectivistic cultures might be more prone to view essences underlying 
collectives (e.g., a Japanese genome), as opposed to essences underlying individual 
differences. Clearly, much research is in order to address the cultural boundaries of the 
effects reported here. 
A second key question that emerges is how broad and enduring are the essentialist 
responses that we have documented? In terms of the breadth of these responses, do 
people only essentialize specific genetic attributions, such as the notion about genes 
underlying criminality, or does encountering the general concept of genes make people 
essentialize all possible domains (e.g., personality, disease, intelligence)? Likewise, if 
people learn that genes underlie a specific domain, such as criminality, are they more 
likely to see genes underlying other specific unrelated domains, such as obesity? These 
questions have not yet been addressed in the published literature. Furthermore, it remains 
unclear how long people will show essentialist responses to a genetic prime. All of the 
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experimental studies that we reviewed documented effects that were measured in a time 
span of a few minutes. Could encountering genetic arguments have more enduring 
consequences?  
Third, is it possible to reduce the magnitude of these kinds of genetic essentialist 
effects? Although our initial efforts to reduce these effects have not been especially 
encouraging (see Cheung, 2016), it seems reasonable to expect that there are likely ways 
of presenting genetic information such that it provokes a less essentialist response. For 
example, the evidence that genetics education is associated with weaker essentialist 
responses suggests that a richer understanding of how genes actually operate leads to less 
of a tendency to equate genes with essences. There may be other ways to reduce 
essentialist biases. For example, perhaps becoming aware that one possesses essentialist 
biases might itself reduce the impact of these effects. 
If recent history can be a guide for how the next few decades will unfold, it 
suggests that people will be increasingly encountering genetic attributions. Given that 
people’s essentialist biases seem to provide people with a fundamental misunderstanding 
of genetic causes, these encounters may well lead people to draw a variety of mistaken 
conclusions. In the face of this flow of new genetic discoveries and personalized genetic 
information, it is important to help people come to understand genetic causes better, so 
they can make more informed decisions about their own lives. 
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